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The First Amendment’s Borders:  The Place of
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First
Amendment Doctrine
David Cole*
In the 1950s and 1960s, when Congress had found the Communist
Party to be engaged in an international conspiracy to overthrow the United
States by force and violence, and when the Ku Klux Klan was terrorizing
black citizens through violent attacks, the Supreme Court repeatedly con-
fronted the question whether the state could criminalize speech or associa-
tion on the ground that it might further such organizations’ illegal ends.  The
Court equivocated for some time, but ultimately reached a clear answer.
With respect to speech, the Court ruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio that the First
Amendment “do[es] not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”1  With respect to association, the Court held in Scales
v. United States2 and its progeny that Congress could not punish membership
in the Communist Party absent proof that an individual specifically intended
to further the party’s unlawful ends.3
These precedents and principles are the linchpin of the First Amend-
ment’s protection of political expression.  The lesson of the Court’s earliest
First Amendment decisions is that limits on the government’s ability to
criminalize speech on the ground that it might lead to harmful conduct are
essential to ensure breathing room for free public discussion on matters of
* Professor, Georgetown Law.  I was counsel for Humanitarian Law Project in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), and am currently counsel for plaintiffs in
Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2011),
both of which are discussed herein.  I would like to thank Irv Gornstein, Carl Grossman, Jules
Lobel, Allegra McLeod, Amanda Shanor, Larry Schwartztol, David Super, Richard Taranto,
and Matt Waxman for their feedback on drafts of this article, and members of the Drake and
Georgetown law faculties for their comments at workshop presentations of this paper.
1 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968) (per curiam).
2 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
3 In Scales, the Court interpreted a statute criminalizing membership in the Communist
Party to require proof of “specific[ ] inten[t] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by
resort to violence.” 367 U.S. at 229 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).
This principle was subsequently applied to a variety of noncriminal sanctions, including the
denial of a security clearance, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 259, 262 (1967) (holding that
the government could not ban Communist Party members from working in defense facilities
absent proof that they had specific intent to further the Party’s unlawful ends); state employ-
ment, Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (“[m]ere knowing membership
without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitution-
ally adequate basis” for barring Communist Party members from employment in a state uni-
versity system); denial of access to school meeting rooms, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
188–89 (1972); and civil damages, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920
(1982).
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public concern.  Political association is equally critical, because free speech
would do little to serve self-government if it did not entail the right to join
forces with like-minded others to advocate for and work toward common
ends.  The rights of speech and association are the lifeblood of self-govern-
ment in a liberal democracy.
In its first decision to address the tension between First Amendment
rights and national security since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
however, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat dramatically from these
principles.  In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,4 decided in 2010, as in
Brandenburg and Scales, the Court addressed the constitutionality of punish-
ing speech and association on the ground that they might further violence.
The law at issue punishes the provision of “material support” to designated
“foreign terrorist organizations.”5  It defines “material support” to include,
among other things, speech, in the form of “expert advice,” “training,”
“service,” and “personnel.”6  The particular speech in question in Humani-
tarian Law Project advocated only nonviolent, lawful ends; the plaintiffs
principally sought to advocate for human rights and peace to and with the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a Kurdish organization in Turkey that the Secre-
tary of State had designated as a “foreign terrorist organization.”  They did
not intend to further the organization’s illegal ends; indeed, they sought to
dissuade it from violence, and to urge it to pursue lawful ends through
peaceful means.  Yet the Court held, by a vote of 6-3, that the First Amend-
ment permitted criminal prosecution of such speech.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the Court did so only after unanimously sid-
ing with plaintiffs on the central dispute between the parties in the briefing:
namely, the standard of review triggered by the statute’s application.  The
government had rested its defense of the statute on the contention that it
regulated only conduct in a content-neutral manner, and therefore needed to
satisfy only deferential “intermediate” scrutiny.  The government did not
even argue that the statute would satisfy any higher degree of scrutiny.  The
Court agreed with the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) that because the law
as applied to plaintiffs penalized speech based on its content, it had to satisfy
the “demanding” scrutiny that content-based laws trigger.  Gerald Gunther
once famously described such “strict scrutiny” as “strict in theory, fatal in
fact,”7 because its application is nearly always the death knell for the law in
question.  In Humanitarian Law Project, however, the Court’s scrutiny was,
in actuality, neither strict nor fatal, nor even “demanding.”  Instead, the
Court engaged in only the most deferential review, and upheld the law in the
absence of any argument, much less evidentiary showing, that prohibiting
plaintiffs’ speech was necessary or narrowly tailored to further a compelling
interest.
4 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
5 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).
6 Id. § 2339B(g)(4).
7 Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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The Humanitarian Law Project decision has potentially grave repercus-
sions.  Most immediately, nongovernmental organizations working to re-
solve conflict or to provide humanitarian assistance may well be unable to
operate where designated “terrorist organizations” are involved, because
any advice or assistance they provide could be criminally prohibited.  Under
this law, for example, when the Carter Center, run by former President
Jimmy Carter, monitored elections in Lebanon in 2009, and met with
Hezbollah, one of the parties to the contest, to explain what the monitors
would look for in a free and fair election,8 it committed a crime by providing
“expert advice,” a form of “material support,” to a designated terrorist or-
ganization.  And when former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, former
Homeland Security advisor Fran Townsend, and former Secretary of Home-
land Security Tom Ridge recently advocated for de-listing a designated ter-
rorist group from Iran in coordination with a leader of the group,9 they too
committed the federal felony of providing “material support” in the form of
“services” to the organization.
Still more troubling, however, are the decision’s potential consequences
for First Amendment doctrine more generally.  If this is the type of scrutiny
that content-based laws enacted in the name of national security are to re-
ceive in the future, the scope of political freedom has been significantly
narrowed.  For the first time in its history, the Court upheld the criminaliza-
tion of speech advocating only nonviolent, lawful ends on the ground that
such speech might unintentionally assist a third party in criminal wrongdo-
ing.  That result calls into question the continuing validity of the Branden-
burg incitement test.  The Court treated a viewpoint-based motive for
suppressing speech not as grounds for invalidation, but as a justification for
the law.  And the Court reduced the right of association to an empty formal-
ism, allowing the government to prohibit, under the rubric of “material sup-
port,” virtually any concrete manifestation of association—such as paying
dues, donating funds, volunteering one’s time or services, or working to-
gether toward common ends, no matter how lawful.10
If these doctrinal developments are generally applicable, Humanitarian
Law Project has dramatically expanded government authority to suppress
political expression and association in the name of national security.  But the
Court did not suggest that it was overruling any prior decisions.  And it
expressly pointed to three facts in stressing the narrowness of its result: (1)
the law leaves unregulated independent advocacy; (2) the speech in question
related to foreign affairs and national security; and (3) the law governed only
speech in coordination with foreign organizations, not domestic groups.  The
Court did not attempt to explain why, as a doctrinal matter, these features
8 See Joshua Hersh, Jimmy Carter Visits Lebanon, NEW YORKER, June 10, 2009, http://
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/06/jimmy-carter-visits-lebanon.html.
9 See Edward Cody, GOP Leaders Criticize Obama’s Iran Policy in Rally for Opposition
Group, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2010, at A6.
10 For an incisive critique of Humanitarian Law Project’s implications, see Owen Fiss, The
World We Live In, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 295 (2011).
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might make a difference to its analysis.  Do any of these facts provide a
reasoned basis for limiting the reach of Humanitarian Law Project?  Can
Humanitarian Law Project be cabined?
This essay seeks to answer these questions.  Part I summarizes the case
and its treatment by the Supreme Court.  Part II details the grave conse-
quences for First Amendment doctrine that the Court’s analysis portends if it
applies generally.  Part III asks whether Humanitarian Law Project can be
limited in ways that would preserve First Amendment protection for other
speech and association disputes involving national security in the future.  I
conclude that none of the Court’s three “distinguishing” factors is sufficient
to reconcile Humanitarian Law Project with the Court’s First Amendment
precedents.  However, reading the decision to require the presence of all
three factors would do the least damage to First Amendment freedoms going
forward and mark the least disruption with established First Amendment
precedents.  On such a reading, the decision would not support the validity
of a prohibition on independent advocacy, speech coordinated with a domes-
tic group, or speech that did not threaten national security.
One case has already provided a testing ground for assessing the sweep
of Humanitarian Law Project.  In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v.
U.S. Department of the Treasury,11 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently held that the First Amendment bars the government from banning
advocacy coordinated with a domestic organization that the government has
labeled “terrorist.”  The court applied Humanitarian Law Project, but rea-
soned that the government had not shown that banning speech coordinated
with a domestic entity whose assets the government had already frozen was
necessary to further the compelling interest in preventing terrorism.  That
decision points the way toward an understanding of Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject that takes the Supreme Court at its word, and limits its reasoning to the
very particular facts presented.
If one is concerned about the potential implications of a decision that
allows the government to make speech advocating human rights a crime, and
that substitutes unquestioning deference for the demanding scrutiny speech
prohibitions generally trigger, it is important to identify a principled path by
which the Court might avoid further harm to First Amendment rights.  This
article seeks to lay that foundation.  The future of free expression and associ-
ation in a post-9/11 world may depend on it.
11 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2011).
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I. THE DECISION
A. The Material Support Statute and Its Application to
Humanitarian Law Project
Almost a year to the day that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols
bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).12  Among other things, this law created a new crime, prohibiting
the provision of “material support” to foreign groups designated as “terror-
ist” by the Secretary of State.  The law expansively defined both “foreign
terrorist organization” and “material support.”  The Secretary of State may
designate as “terrorist” any foreign group that engages in virtually any un-
lawful use of a weapon against person or property,13 and whose activities she
determines undermine the “national defense, foreign relations, or economic
interests of the United States.”14  Once a group has been designated, it is a
crime to knowingly provide “material support” to it.  “Material support”
includes not only funds and tangible goods, but also any “service,” “expert
advice or assistance,” “training,” and “personnel”—provisions that can be
applied to speech.15
When the law was enacted, the Humanitarian Law Project, a human
rights organization based in Los Angeles, had been working with the Kurdi-
stan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, encouraging it to resolve its disputes
with the Turkish government through peaceful, lawful means.  It taught
the PKK how to file human rights complaints before the United Nations
and helped it file such complaints, assisted it in peace overtures to the Turk-
ish government, and advocated in coordination with it for Kurdish human
rights.  In 1977, the Secretary of State designated the PKK a “foreign ter-
rorist organization,” which appeared to make the HLP’s activities a crime.
The HLP and several others filed suit, seeking a ruling that their intend-
ed activities could not be constitutionally prohibited.16  In the district
12 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
13 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2004); id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)–(VI) (defining “terrorist activ-
ity” to include, among other things, any unlawful use of, or threat to use, a weapon against
person or property, unless for mere personal monetary gain).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(2) (defining “national security”).
15 18 U.S.C. §2339 (2002).  “Training” is defined as “instruction or teaching designed to
impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” Id. § 2339A(b)(2).  “Expert advice
or assistance” is defined as “advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge.” Id. § 2339A(b)(3).  “Personnel” is defined as acting under an organ-
ization’s “direction or control.” Id. § 2339B(h).  The statute does not define “service,” but the
government maintained in litigation that “service” included any “act done for the benefit of” a
designated group.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 1567496, at *9.
16 As the district court found, the HLP sought to: provide training in the use of humanita-
rian and international law for the peaceful resolution of disputes, engage in political advocacy
on behalf of the Kurds working in Turkey, and teach the PKK how to petition for relief before
representative bodies like the United Nations.  Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-
1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 WL 36105333, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2001).  In their original
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court17 and court of appeals,18 plaintiffs were generally successful in invali-
dating the speech-related provisions on vagueness grounds.
B. The Majority Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the material support law as applied to plain-
tiffs’ proposed activities.  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that, even though the statute punished speech on the basis of its
content, thereby triggering “demanding” scrutiny, it satisfied that scrutiny.19
With respect to the right of association, the Court reasoned that the statute
did not ban membership in designated groups, but only material support, and
that in any event, the same reasons that justified the restrictions on plaintiffs’
speech also justified any infringements on association.20
As noted above, the Court sided with plaintiffs in concluding that, as
applied, the statute penalized speech on the basis of its content, and therefore
had to satisfy “demanding” scrutiny, not the lenient “intermediate” scrutiny
upon which the Solicitor General had rested her defense of the statute.  The
Court reasoned that where laws regulating both conduct and speech are ap-
plied to speech, and particularly where they are applied to speech because of
its content, heightened scrutiny is required.  Plaintiffs’ intended support
came in the form of pure speech—the communication of ideas through
words—and nothing more.  Moreover, the statute targeted speech by refer-
ence to its content, in the form of “training” and “expert advice.”  As the
Court held, “[Section] 2339B regulates speech on the basis of its content,”21
and therefore “we are outside of [intermediate scrutiny], and we must [ap-
ply] a more demanding standard.”22
Chief Justice Roberts never actually used the term “strict scrutiny,” but
the cases he relied upon all applied strict scrutiny.  Thus, in Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a “breach of the peace” ordinance
that generally forbade conduct, where it was applied to Cohen because of
what his jacket (bearing the logo “Fuck the Draft”) communicated.23  Simi-
larly, in Texas v. Johnson, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a flag burning
prohibition because the ban was motivated by the message that flag burning
was thought to communicate.24  The Humanitarian Law Project Court rea-
soned that as applied to plaintiffs’ speech, the material support prohibitions
complaint, plaintiffs also sought to make monetary donations to lawful activities of the PKK.
However, the lower courts rejected their right to do so, and in the Supreme Court, plaintiffs did
not press any claims regarding financial assistance, and instead limited their claims to the
provision of pure speech.
17 Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
18 Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009).
19 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
20 Id. at 2730–31.
21 Id. at 2723.
22 Id. at 2724 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)) (second alteration in
original).
23 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
24 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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were similarly content-based, and triggered what Chief Justice Roberts la-
beled “demanding” scrutiny.25
Under that test, content-based laws are invalid unless the government
establishes that the particular content distinctions drawn are “the least re-
strictive means” to further a “compelling interest.”26  “[T]he curtailment of
free speech must be actually necessary to the solution.”27  And “[i]t is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be per-
missible.”28  In as-applied challenges, moreover, the government must jus-
tify the necessity not just of the statute in general, but of the specific
prohibitions of plaintiffs’ speech.29
The Court’s actual inquiry in Humanitarian Law Project, however,
bears little resemblance to these standards.  No one disputed that the govern-
ment had a compelling interest in deterring and preventing terrorism; the
critical issue was whether criminalizing plaintiffs’ advocacy of human rights
and peace was “narrowly tailored,” the “least intrusive means,” or “neces-
sary” to furthering that interest.  Congress itself had made no findings re-
garding advocacy of human rights or peace, or indeed regarding any of the
specific statutory provisions at issue in Humanitarian Law Project (training,
personnel, expert advice or assistance, or service). The only evidence the
government offered was a single affidavit from a State Department official,
Kenneth R. McKune, which combined conclusory assertions about the struc-
ture of terrorist organizations with hearsay allegations about specific violent
acts of the PKK.30  It said nothing whatsoever about speech, much less
whether prohibiting plaintiffs’ advocacy of human rights and peace was nar-
rowly tailored to preventing terrorism.31  Nor did the government make any
argument in its briefs that prohibiting plaintiffs’ specific speech was neces-
sary to prevent terrorism.  Instead, the government sought only to justify
prohibiting “material support” as a general matter.  Thus, it argued that
money is fungible, that aid furthering lawful activities might free up re-
sources that the organization could then use for terrorism, and that such aid
might “bolste[r] a terrorist organization’s efficacy and strength in a commu-
25 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
26 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
27 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
28 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
29 Thus, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court entertained an as-applied challenge
to § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), even though the Court had previ-
ously upheld § 203 as facially valid.  551 U.S. 449 (2007).  As the Court explained, “[t]hese
cases, however, present the separate question whether § 203 may be constitutionally applied to
these specific ads . . . . [T]he Government must prove that applying BCRA to WRTL’s ads
furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id. at 464; see
also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (as-applied
First Amendment analysis); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995)
(same).
30 Joint Appendix at 127–38, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010)
(Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3877534, at *127–38.
31 Id.
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nity” and thereby “undermin[e] this nation’s efforts to delegitimize and
weaken those groups.”32
In the absence of any argument or evidence from the government to
meet its burden, and particularly as the burden was first imposed by the
Supreme Court itself, the usual course would be to remand for further
factfinding, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested at oral argument.33  The lower
courts had not applied heightened scrutiny, and had not subjected the gov-
ernment’s evidentiary submission (a single affidavit) to any adversarial test-
ing whatsoever, as they deemed it immaterial.  Where stringent scrutiny
applies, the courts insist that the government identify specific justifications
and support them with evidence.34  Yet instead of remanding to put the gov-
ernment to that test, the Court simply upheld the statute based on its own
proffered justifications—justifications that the government never even ad-
vanced, much less supported with evidence.
Thus, the Court posited that teaching a group how to bring human
rights claims before the United Nations human rights bodies might lead the
group to use those tactics “to threaten, manipulate and disrupt,” and de-
clared this threat to be “real, not remote,” even though the government had
never articulated such a concern, much less substantiated it with any evi-
dence.35  It also asserted, again without government support, that assisting a
group in peace negotiations might lead the group to “pursue peaceful negoti-
ations as a means of buying time to recover from short-term setbacks, lulling
opponents into complacency, and ultimately preparing for renewed at-
tacks.”36  It speculated that the “relief” the PKK might obtain from the UN
“could readily include monetary aid,”37 which could then be used for terror-
ism, even though the government did not suggest as much, and the UN
human rights bodies are not authorized to order monetary damages as re-
lief.38  And the Court opined, again without any suggestion by the govern-
32 Brief for the Respondents at 14–15, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (Nos.
08–1498, 09–89), 2009 WL 4951303, at *56.
33 Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (Nos.
08–1498, 09–89); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (remand-
ing for development of evidence to sustain government’s burden).
34 See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny
to invalidate racial preferences in contracting because state failed to offer evidence of the
discrimination in the construction industry that the state claimed to be remedying through the
preferences).  Even under the less demanding intermediate scrutiny that the Humanitarian Law
Project Court rejected, the government “must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and
meaningful way.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 664.
35 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729.
36 Id. at 2729. The majority cited a book on the PKK that reported that the PKK once
suspended armed struggle, but later resumed it, as its only empirical support for this proposi-
tion—support that the government itself never offered.  The book in fact offers no indication
that the PKK used peacemaking negotiation skills in so doing, or that the suspension was not
undertaken in good faith, but merely that there was a temporary ceasefire. See id. at 2738
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 2729.
38 Id. at 2738–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ment, that tolerating advocacy in support of foreign terrorist groups might
“strain[ ] the United States’ relationships with its allies.”39
The Court did also recite the general concerns that the government had
actually proffered: namely, that money is fungible; that material support
might free up other resources; and that material support might “lend legiti-
macy to foreign terrorist groups . . . that makes it easier for these groups to
persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds.”40 But it cited no evidence
that training in human rights advocacy or efforts to advance peace, the activ-
ities at issue, are fungible in the way money is, or that they would free up
resources the PKK was actually directing toward such activities.  Nor did the
Court cite any evidence that plaintiffs’ speech would have the “legitimizing”
effect it feared, or that advocacy for human rights had enabled any group to
engage in terrorism.
The Court disposed of plaintiffs’ right of association claim in three
paragraphs.  It stated, without explanation, that its precedents addressing
membership and assembly were not applicable because the statute does not
ban membership per se, but only material support.41  And it asserted that the
reasons it had deemed sufficient to justify the criminalization of speech also
justified the selective criminalization of speech when done in association
with specifically designated “foreign terrorist organizations.”42
C. The Dissent
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.
He stressed that plaintiffs sought to engage solely in political speech, to
which the First Amendment ordinarily offers its highest protection.  He
found no evidence that advocating peace or human rights would free up
resources that the PKK could use for terrorism.43  He rejected the govern-
ment’s “legitimacy” rationale as inconsistent with the Court’s precedents in-
validating prohibitions on association with the Communist Party.44  He
deemed the statute arbitrary in its prohibition of “coordinated” but not “in-
dependent” advocacy, as both forms of speech posed the same “risks.”45  He
found that there was “serious doubt” as to the statute’s validity as the gov-
ernment interpreted it, and reasoned that those doubts could be allayed by
interpreting the statute to criminalize “First-Amendment-protected pure
speech and association only when the defendant knows or intends that those
activities will assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist actions.”46  Under
39 Id. at 2726.
40 Id. at 2725.
41 Id. at 2730.
42 Id. at 2731.
43 Id. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 2736–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 2740 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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that interpretation, plaintiffs would have been free to engage in their in-
tended speech.
Justice Breyer concluded his opinion by criticizing the majority for fail-
ing to apply the “demanding” scrutiny it claimed was appropriate:
[T]he Court has failed to examine the Government’s justifications
with sufficient care.  It has failed to insist upon specific evidence,
rather than general assertion.  It has failed to require tailoring of
means to fit compelling ends.  And ultimately it deprives the indi-
viduals before us of the protection that the First Amendment
demands.47
II. DEPARTURES FROM PRECEDENT AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES
As Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, the rationale and result in Hu-
manitarian Law Project sharply depart from some of the Court’s most funda-
mental First Amendment precedents and principles.  If these departures
reflect a new direction for speech protections when they clash with national
security interests in the post-9/11 world, the decision will have grave conse-
quences.  The principal question going forward, therefore, is what effect the
decision will have on the trajectory of First Amendment doctrine and the
scope of speech and associational rights.  If the past is prologue, future
threats to our security will prompt the political branches to impose additional
restrictions on speech and association, and the government will surely cite
Humanitarian Law Project in defending such measures.  The majority’s ap-
proach departed radically from precedent, so if the Court’s reasoning is gen-
erally applicable to restrictions on speech imposed in the name of national
security, the consequences for First Amendment doctrine are deeply
troubling.
A. Whither Brandenburg?
Before Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court had ruled that
even express advocacy of crime is protected unless it meets the Brandenburg
“imminent incitement” test.  The related principle that speech advocating
lawful activity cannot be prohibited in the name of deterring someone else’s
illegal conduct dates back to some of the Court’s earliest First Amendment
decisions.  In De Jonge v. Oregon,48 the Court invalidated the conviction of
an individual who spoke and recruited on behalf of the Communist Party at a
meeting held under Party auspices.49  The Court accepted that the Party en-
gaged in illegal activities, but held that De Jonge could not be convicted for
47 Id. at 2743 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
49 Id. at 365.
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his work on its behalf because he advocated only “peaceable” activity.50
The Court noted that if individuals are “engaged in a conspiracy against the
public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy.”51  But,
the Court continued, “it is a different matter when the State, instead of pros-
ecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peacea-
ble assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge.”52  In Humanitarian Law Project, however, the Court held that “a
lawful public discussion” about human rights advocacy or peace could be
“the basis for a criminal charge.”53
More recently, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,54 the Court struck
down a federal statute banning “virtual child pornography,” and rejected
arguments that the restriction was justified because such materials might be
used by third parties to seduce children, or might increase demand for child
pornography using actual children.  As the Court explained, “the govern-
ment may not prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful
act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’” 55  Yet in Humanita-
rian Law Project, the Court upheld the punishment of plaintiffs’ speech, ad-
vocating only lawful, nonviolent activities, on speculation that such speech
might facilitate the PKK’s pursuit of terrorism at some indefinite future time.
Much lawful advocacy could be linked, at least in the indirect way
deemed sufficient in Humanitarian Law Project, to wrongdoing by another.
Could the state prohibit the provision of job training to gang members on the
theory that the skills might make them more effective criminals?  Could
training in nonviolent mediation be prohibited on the ground that it might
“legitimate” the gang, thereby making it more attractive to new members
who might commit future crimes?  Could peaceable environmental advocacy
coordinated with Greenpeace be banned because the organization sometimes
engages in illegal trespass or property damage as civil disobedience?
Before Humanitarian Law Project, the answers to these questions
would have been simple. Brandenburg established that even speech directly
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), the Court relied on De
Jonge to hold that the leader of and participants in an economic boycott could not be held
liable for illegal violence that attended the boycott absent proof that they engaged in or directly
incited the violence. Id. at 908–09, 932–34; id. at 928 (“When [an advocate’s] appeals do not
incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech.”).
53 Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2733 (2010) (quoting De Jonge,
299 U.S. at 365).
54 535 U.S. 234 (2002).  See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–30 (2001) (“[I]t
would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can
be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”).
55 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per
curiam)); id. at 250 (noting that the “harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but
depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts”).  The Court has also
previously rejected attempts to criminalize advocacy of lawful activities to secure peace and
safety during war, Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589 (1943), and to prevent a breach of
the peace, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (2005); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S.
111, 112 (1969).
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advocating criminal conduct could not be penalized unless it was intended
and likely to produce “imminent lawless action.”56  Speech advocating law-
ful, peaceable activity was plainly protected, even when done in coordina-
tion with a group that engaged in illegal activities that threatened the United
States, such as the Communist Party.  After Humanitarian Law Project, the
answers are less clear, because for the first time, the Court upheld the
criminalization of speech advocating no crime whatsoever.
B. Deferential Strict Scrutiny
The second dramatic departure from precedent with potentially grave
consequences for the future of First Amendment law was the “deferential
strict scrutiny” the Court applied.  As illustrated above, the Court claimed to
be applying the “demanding” scrutiny traditionally triggered by content-
based speech regulation.  But the Court actually applied an unrecognizably
lenient form of that scrutiny.  Outside the speech area, the Court has often
deemed it appropriate to defer to the political branches on national security
and foreign affairs.57  But never before has the Court substituted deference
for stringent scrutiny in reviewing a content-based regulation of speech.  Yet
rather than put the government to the test of demonstrating with actual evi-
dence that its prohibitions of human rights and peace advocacy were neces-
sary to combat terrorism, the Court engaged in little meaningful scrutiny at
all.
Indeed, the Court went beyond deference, offering up its own argu-
ments for how speech might implicate national security, arguments that the
political branches never even asserted.  Deference is usually predicated on
the notion that the political branches are better situated to make the requisite
judgment calls.  But in this case, the Court engaged in more analysis of the
potential relation of speech to national security than both of the other
branches combined.
The Court’s deference is illustrated by its heavy reliance on a “finding”
that Congress included in the material support statute.58  The “finding”
states in full that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are
so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organi-
zation facilitates that conduct.”59  The Court never asked whether the legisla-
tive record contained any evidence to support this claim.  It is not actually a
factual finding in any real sense, but a conclusory assertion about a whole
category of unidentified entities.  Congress defined “terrorist activity” to
56 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also Hess, 414 U.S. at 108–09
(holding that the First Amendment prohibits application of a disorderly conduct statute to pure
speech that, while advocating illegal activity, did not incite it).
57 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).
58 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2712, 2724, 2726.
59 AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(1)–(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996), note fol-
lowing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Findings and Purpose).
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include virtually any threat to use a weapon against person or property, so
hundreds if not thousands of foreign organizations likely fall within the cate-
gory of “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity.”  It also dele-
gated the designation of specific organizations to the Secretary of State, so
which groups would be designated could not be predicted.  Yet Congress
heard no evidence regarding the effect of contributions on any organization,
much less on all “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity.”
It is one thing, as Congress did with respect to the Communist Party in
the 1950s, to hold hearings on and make specific findings about a particular
organization based on extensive evidence presented about the group.  It is
another matter simply to insert a boilerplate conclusion about a virtually
limitless category of groups, without entertaining evidence about any of
them.60  Again, deference may be warranted where there is evidence that the
political branches applied their expertise to evidence; here, however, the leg-
islative record is devoid of any evidence related to this “finding.”  Should
the political branches be free, in the national security arena, to make con-
clusory assertions without any evidentiary support and then use them as
trump cards to justify infringements on rights of speech or association?  Or
should the Court have remanded for factfinding, even if only for the purpose
of determining whether there was any factual basis to support the finding?
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,61 the Court dismissed a congressional finding ad-
vanced to support a statute criminalizing speech because “the relevant fac-
tual foundation [wa]s not to be found in the legislative record.”62  In
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court did not even ask if there was a founda-
tion in the record for Congress’s sweeping “finding.”
Congress’s “finding,” moreover, is limited to “contributions,” not
speech.  Congress made no finding that speech advocating human rights and
peace has the same effect.  The Court reasoned that because Congress pro-
hibited “training” and “personnel” when it enacted this finding in 1996, it
must have intended “contributions” to encompass speech.  But the legisla-
tive history shows that Congress did not contemplate its prohibitions reach-
ing coordinated advocacy with designated groups.63  Ordinarily, Congress’s
60 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1996) (enumerating the expansive criteria Congress uses for
the designation of “foreign terrorist organizations”).
61 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
62 Id. at 530–31, 531 n.17; cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503–11
(1984) (finding appellate courts have independent obligation to assess facts where First
Amendment freedoms are at stake).
63 A key House Report states that the statute was not intended to reach protected speech
and association.  The Report recognizes that “[t]he First Amendment protects one’s right to
associate with groups that are involved in both legal and illegal activities,” and insists that
“[t]he basic protection of free association afforded individuals under the First Amendment
remains in place” because the statute does not prohibit “one’s right to think, speak, or opine in
concert with, or on behalf of, such an organization.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43, 44 (1995).
Quoting the Report, the government argued that after the 2001 and 2004 amendments the
Report still reflected Congress’s intent and even added: “Congress noted that the statutory ban
‘only affects one’s contribution of financial or material resources.’” First Cross-Appeal Brief
for Appellants at 5–6, Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Nos. 05-56753, 05-56846), 2006 WL 2982037, at *4 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 44).
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findings in the First Amendment area must be specific to speech and sup-
ported by evidence.64  This finding was neither.
The Court maintained that deference was appropriate because the gov-
ernment’s interest was “preventive,”65 and because in the realm of foreign
affairs and national security, the political branches have greater expertise.66
But virtually all laws are “preventive,” as they seek to prevent undesired
conduct from occurring.  And virtually any anti-terrorism law will touch on
matters of national security and foreign relations.  Moreover, neither Con-
gress nor the Executive had actually spoken to the specific issue at hand;
namely, whether it was necessary to prohibit advocacy of human rights and
peace in order to halt terrorist activity.  The Court did not so much defer to
these branches’ expertise, as make up arguments that neither Congress nor
the Executive had advanced, and then approve those arguments without any
evidentiary basis.  If the “demanding” scrutiny applicable to laws penalizing
speech on the basis of its content can be satisfied by such “evidence” when-
ever “national security” is said to be at stake, the First Amendment will
offer scant protection against future government efforts to censor speech on
such grounds.67
C. “Legitimizing” Viewpoint Discrimination
The Court’s acceptance of the government’s interest in “delegitimizing”
disfavored political organizations as a justification for suppressing speech is
a third dramatic departure from precedent that, if generally applicable, di-
rectly jeopardizes much of what we have come to rely on as First Amend-
ment freedoms.  The Court reasoned that even if plaintiffs’ advocacy of
human rights and peacemaking was not itself capable of being turned to
illegal ends, it could be prohibited on the ground that engaging in such com-
munications with a designated group might send the message that the group
has “legitimacy,” and that message might then be used by the group to at-
tract financial or other support that could be used for terrorist ends.68  If the
government’s desire to suppress messages it disapproves of is sufficient to
justify content-based prohibitions on speech generally, it is difficult to imag-
ine any censorship law that would be invalid.
Such a justification, for example, would require reversal of the Court’s
long line of Communist Party cases.  The government in those cases specifi-
64 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530–31, 531 n.17.
65 Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010).
66 Id. at 2727.
67 It is nonetheless important that no member of the Court accepted the government’s
argument that the statute as applied should be treated as a content-neutral regulation of con-
duct.  Had the Court ruled for the government on that theory, the damage done to First Amend-
ment jurisprudence would have been much greater, for that rationale for deference would not
be limited to national security or foreign relations matters.  Instead, deferential scrutiny would
be appropriate wherever the government, in addition to criminalizing speech, also prohibited
some related conduct.
68 Id. at 2725.
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cally argued that it should be able to ban “active support of any kind,” even
support exclusively of the Party’s lawful ends, because such aid would inevi-
tably help the organization achieve its illegal ends.69  In the words of Chief
Justice Roberts, associating with the Communist Party to further its lawful
ends risks “lend[ing it] legitimacy . . . that makes it easier for [it] to persist,
to recruit members, and to raise funds . . . .”70
Indeed, the government’s argument was, if anything, stronger with re-
spect to the Communist Party than with respect to the PKK.  Congress had
made detailed findings, based on extensive factual hearings, that the Com-
munist Party was part of an international conspiracy using terrorism and
other illegal methods to overthrow the United States by force and violence.71
Congress further found that the Communist Party was controlled by the
world communist movement and supported by the world’s second greatest
superpower, a nation with which we were in a potentially planet-ending nu-
clear arms race.  The Court questioned none of that.  Yet it repeatedly in-
sisted that anti-Communist laws must carefully distinguish between those
who associated with the Communist Party to further its legal ends and those
who did so to further its illegal ends, and between those who incited illegal
conduct and those who advocated abstract ideas.72  Had the Court accepted
the interest in “delegitimizing” the Party, no such distinctions would have
been required, because all speech or association, regardless of its motivation
or content, risked “legitimizing” the Party. Indeed, from a “legitimizing”
vantage point, the government might well be more concerned by speech and
association in furtherance of the Party’s legal activities than by speech fur-
thering its illegal ends.
The “legitimacy” rationale seeks to suppress a particular disfavored
message—namely, that groups the United States wants to treat as “illegiti-
mate” are “legitimate.”  At bottom, this is a viewpoint-discriminatory justi-
fication.  Ordinarily, a viewpoint-based purpose is sufficient to invalidate a
69 Brief for the United States on Reargument, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
(No. 1), 1959 WL 101542, at *22–23 (arguing that active membership in the Communist Party
can be proscribed “even though the activity be expended along lines not otherwise illegal,
since active support of any kind aids the organization in achieving its own illegal purposes”);
id. at *8 (“[K]nowingly joining an organization with illegal objectives contributes to the at-
tainment of these objectives because of the support given by membership itself.”); id. at *11
(“Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization.”) (quot-
ing Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679, 684 (4th Cir. 1952)).
70 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725.
71 Congress found that there “exists a world Communist movement . . . whose purpose it
is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration . . . espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means
deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries through-
out the world through the medium of a world-wide Communist organization.”  50 U.S.C.
§ 781 (West 1991) (repealed 1993), quoted in Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509
n.8 (1964).  The American Communist Party, Congress found, was directed and controlled by
this “world Communist movement.” See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2737
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1961)).
72 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290, 296–97 (1961); Scales, 367 U.S. 203 at 229–30; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 316 (1957).
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law.  Thus, the Court has held that even where the government is merely
regulating access to government benefits, viewpoint discrimination is pre-
sumptively impermissible.73  It has struck down a law that discriminated on
the basis of viewpoint even within the category of otherwise unprotected
speech.74  Here, by contrast, the Court accepted the government’s desire to
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint as a justification for suppressing
speech.
Suppose a state or local government decides that it wants to deny legiti-
macy to a political organization that has engaged in illegal activities.  Could
it penalize any speech addressed to or coordinated with that group, on the
ground that it may lend the group legitimacy?  In Healy v. James,75 the Court
held unconstitutional a state university’s refusal to recognize and provide
meeting space to a student branch of the Students for a Democratic Society
based on the larger group’s violent activities.76  After Humanitarian Law
Project, could a university successfully defend such action on the ground
that it seeks to deny “legitimacy” to a group that had used violence?  Could
a city bar speech in support of the “Occupy Wall Street” movement on the
ground that it might legitimate the movement and further its violations of
property laws and zoning regulations?
D. An Empty Right of Association
The Court’s decision defined the right of association in ways that, if
applied generally, would reduce that right to the most formalistic of mean-
ings.  The Humanitarian Law Project plaintiffs argued that the law violated
their associational rights because the trigger for criminal prohibition was
association with a particular political group.  Advocating for peace and
human rights is fully tolerated under the material support law as long as it is
done independently or in coordination with a non-proscribed group.  But the
very same speech, communicated to or in coordination with the PKK, is a
crime.  One could file an amicus brief challenging the material support law
on behalf of oneself, or any organization that was not designated, but not on
behalf of the PKK.  A law that banned campaign speech only when it was
done in coordination with the Democratic Party, but not when done indepen-
dently or with the Republican Party, would plainly be viewed as infringing
the right to association.  The material support law is of the same character.
73 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (stating
that in public forum, even where content lines may sometimes be legal, “viewpoint discrimi-
nation . . . is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the fo-
rum’s limitations”); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1991) (striking down hate
crimes law as applied to speech because it was viewpoint-based); Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (excluding religious group from using school facilities after
hours constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
74 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (striking down law that prohibited fighting words that expressed
certain messages but not others).
75 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
76 Id. at 180.
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The Court concluded first that the right of association was not infringed
because the law bans only “material support,” not membership or associa-
tion simpliciter. But as shown above, the only thing that makes the filing of
an amicus brief a crime is the fact of its association with a proscribed group.
The fact that the law selectively punishes speech when expressed in associa-
tion with another would seem to render the law more unconstitutional (be-
cause it violates both the rights of speech and association), not save it from
invalidation.
After Humanitarian Law Project, Congress presumably could reenact
every one of the anti-Communist penalties and disabilities that the Supreme
Court invalidated, simply by penalizing “speaking in coordination with,”
instead of “membership in,” the Communist Party.  The Court has never
before suggested that the right of association is so devoid of substance.  On
the contrary, it has affirmed that the First Amendment protects the “right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, eco-
nomic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”77  Through the right of as-
sociation, the Court has protected the rights to “peaceable assembly for
lawful discussion”;78 to solicit members to the Communist Party and circu-
late literature;79 to organize a boycott, even where it included substantial acts
of violence;80 and to litigate for social and political purposes.81  All of these
acts could be characterized as “material support”; does that mean that they
are no longer protected by the right of association?
The Court also reasoned that any infringement of associational rights
was justified for the same reasons that justified the restrictions on plaintiffs’
speech.82  But that does not necessarily follow.  A statute that restricted po-
litical campaign contributions on an across-the-board, non-partisan basis, for
example, might satisfy First Amendment scrutiny, as the contribution limits
in Buckley v. Valeo did.83  But it does not follow that a statute that selectively
restricted contributions to the Republican Party but not the Democratic
Party, or vice versa, would be constitutional for the same reasons.  Rather,
the government would have to justify separately why it was treating some
parties differently from others.  In Buckley itself, for example, the govern-
ment had to separately defend the statute’s differential treatment, for pur-
poses of public financing, of candidates who had received over twenty-five
percent and under twenty-five percent of the vote.84
After Humanitarian Law Project, it would appear that the right of asso-
ciation is limited to holding a membership card.  If this distinction is valid,
what is to stop Congress from barring members of disfavored political
77 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
78 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
79 Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937).
80 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–09 (1982).
81 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963).
82 Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010).
83 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
84 Id. at 85–108 (holding that differential treatment of candidates does not violate equal
protection or First Amendment).
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groups from doing anything to support the group they join?  As in Humani-
tarian Law Project, the government could claim that citizens remain free to
join the proscribed groups—but they cannot pay dues, volunteer their time,
speak in coordination with, or provide the group with anything of value.
The right of association would be a nullity.
In sum, Humanitarian Law Project departed from precedent in signifi-
cant and troubling ways.  If these departures reflect a new course for First
Amendment doctrine in the post-9/11 context, they portend radically dimin-
ished protection of political speech.  Yet the Court did not suggest that it was
overruling any of the precedents discussed herein.  If Humanitarian Law
Project is to be harmonized with these precedents, therefore, it must be read
narrowly.  The following section explores the grounds for narrow construc-
tion that the Court itself proposed.
III. POSSIBLE DISTINCTIONS
The Court made little or no attempt to reconcile the reasoning in its
decision with conflicting precedent.  It did point to three possible distin-
guishing features of the case: (1) the law at issue proscribed only advocacy
provided to or in coordination with a designated group, and did not reach
independent advocacy;85 (2) the government’s interest was to further national
security and foreign relations;86 and (3) the law regulated only speech ad-
dressed to or expressed in coordination with foreign organizations, not do-
mestic groups.87  The Court did not, however, offer any explanation for why
these factors might make a difference.  Do any of these factors provide a
satisfactory basis for reconciling the decision with First Amendment prece-
dent or principle?  In this section, I first show that no factor standing alone
can rationalize the result.  But I then conclude that the best way to read the
case to harmonize it with precedent and to limit its deleterious effect on
future speech and association disputes is to limit it to situations in which all
three distinguishing features are present.
There is certainly reason to believe that the analysis in Humanitarian
Law Project is not generally applicable.  After all, the very next Term, in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,88 the Court struck down a ban on
violent video games, applying strict scrutiny as it has traditionally been un-
derstood, and finding the law insufficiently narrowly tailored to the compel-
ling state interests identified.  Among other problems, the Court found
insufficient evidence that violent video games caused children to be vio-
lent.89  And the same Term that it decided Humanitarian Law Project, the
85 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726.
86 Id. at 2727.
87 Id. at 2731.
88 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
89 Id. at 2739, 2741–42.
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Court in Citizens United v. FEC90 applied demanding scrutiny to invalidate a
requirement that corporations use segregated funds for campaign spending.
The Court rejected as insufficiently supported by evidence the government’s
argument that unrestricted corporate expenditures could lead to corruption of
politicians, despite extensive congressional findings and evidence docu-
menting precisely such corruption.91
In other words, Humanitarian Law Project notwithstanding, the strict
scrutiny standard appears to be alive and well, and the Court has shown
itself willing to apply it in its traditional stringent form to invalidate content-
based speech restrictions that indisputably are designed to further compel-
ling government ends.  What, then, might explain the very different analysis
employed in Humanitarian Law Project?
A. The Court’s Proffered Distinguishing Features
Considered Independently
1. Independent vs. Coordinated Speech
The majority repeatedly emphasized that the material support law pro-
hibited only speech coordinated with or directed to “foreign terrorist organi-
zations,” not independent advocacy, implying that a ban on independent
advocacy might be viewed differently.  The Court did not hold as much, as it
merely interpreted the law not to prohibit independent advocacy.92  But the
Court found it “significant that Congress has been conscious of its own re-
sponsibility to consider how its actions may implicate constitutional con-
cerns,” and that “most importantly, Congress has avoided any restriction on
independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated
with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”93  And in specifying what it
had not decided, the Court stressed that “in particular, we in no way suggest
that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster,
even if the Government were to show that such speech benefits foreign ter-
rorist organizations.”94
The Court never specified, however, why the analysis would differ if
the statute barred independent advocacy.  On the government interest side of
the analysis, coordinated advocacy is no more harmful than independent ad-
vocacy.  As Justice Breyer pointed out, independent advocacy could just as
90 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
91 Id. at 910–11.
92 Indeed, the Court also declined to address whether “coordinated advocacy” in the form
of lobbying Congress or the UN could constitutionally be prohibited as a “service,” because it
concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their proposed activities in that regard were
insufficiently specific to present a concrete controversy. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. at 2729.
93 Id. at 2728.
94 Id. at 2730.
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effectively lend a designated organization legitimacy.95  Indeed, independent
advocacy might well provide more legitimacy—precisely because of its in-
dependence.  And if independent advocacy substitutes for work the group
itself might have done, it would have the same potential to free up resources.
(This is a common feature, for example, of “independent expenditures” in
campaign finance, which often allow the candidate to spend more resources
in other ways.)  The fact that speech is coordinated with or directed to a
designated group might make it easier as a factual matter to establish that it
benefitted the group, but in theory there is no reason why independent
speech could not also offer the group substantial benefits.
A ban on independent advocacy would be especially challenging to en-
force, because in order to determine whether particular speech was providing
impermissible aid to a designated group, the government would have to as-
sess its content.  But as the Humanitarian Law Project Court acknowledged,
the material support statute’s ban on “training” and “expert advice” also
requires the government to examine the content of speech, yet that posed no
obstacle to its validation by the Court.
Nor does there appear to be any basis to conclude that independent
advocacy deserves greater protection than advocacy directed to or coordi-
nated with another, even a “foreign terrorist organization.”  Speech is al-
most always a relational act; we almost always speak to, or in coordination
with, someone else.  But the identity of the person to or with whom we
speak does not generally reduce the protection the speech deserves.  An op-
ed written by two authors is no less deserving of protection than one written
by a single author.
Indeed, a law that targets coordinated speech for suppression may well
be more suspect than one that targets independent advocacy.  Speech to and
with others more directly serves the First Amendment’s goals of promoting
self-government and the search for truth than speech kept entirely to oneself.
The First Amendment is ultimately designed to protect the exchange of
ideas, which necessarily involves either directing one’s speech to another or
some other form of coordination.  And what is coordinated speech but
speech plus association, both of which are constitutionally protected?  As the
Supreme Court has stated, “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”96  The
fact that speech is coordinated should make it doubly protected, not cause it
to lose its protection.
In the campaign finance arena, the Court has upheld restrictions on co-
ordinated expenditures for speech that would be invalid as applied to inde-
pendent expenditures.97  But the rationale for doing so stems from the
95 Id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (quoting NAACP v. Ala.
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
97 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003).
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Court’s initial distinction between contributions and expenditures in Buckley
v. Valeo.98  There, the Court concluded that while restrictions on campaign
contributions and expenditures both trigger heightened First Amendment
scrutiny, a ceiling on contributions is less undermining of First Amendment
values and more closely tailored to the state’s compelling interest in avoiding
the appearance and reality of quid pro quo corruption than a restriction on
expenditures.99  Coordinated expenditures may be treated as contributions to
ensure that they do not become an end-run around the permissible restric-
tions on contributions.
This rationale does not extend to the material support statute.  The cam-
paign finance restrictions applied only to expenditures or contributions of
money,100 and expressly permitted individuals to volunteer as much of their
own time and speech to a political campaign as they chose.101  The law im-
posed no restrictions on pure speech, whether coordinated or independent.
Moreover, the Court emphasized that even the limit on contributions was a
ceiling, not an outright ban, and thereby enabled individuals to express their
support for a candidate through donating, limiting only the size of such do-
nations.102  The object of regulation in Humanitarian Law Project, by con-
trast, was not an expenditure of money, but pure speech.  And the law
imposed an outright ban, not a ceiling.  A law that prohibited pure speech
when communicated to or in coordination with a candidate would not with-
stand First Amendment scrutiny under the Buckley analysis.
Thus, there appears to be no satisfactory rationale for the distinction
between independent and coordinated speech.  Certainly, the Court offered
none.
2. National Security and Foreign Relations
The Court defended its deferential analysis by noting that the statute
concerns “national security and foreign affairs,” and “addresses acute for-
eign policy concerns involving relationships with our Nation’s allies.”103
These facts did not warrant an “abdication of the judicial role,” the Court
explained, but “respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.”104
The Court added that because the law was “a preventive measure” and ad-
dressed “evolving threats in an area where information can be difficult to
obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess,” the government
“is not required to conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we
grant weight to its empirical conclusions.”105
98 424 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1976).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 12–14.
101 Id. at 35.
102 See id. at 21–22.
103 Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2727–28.
168 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 6
The national security and foreign relations features of the material sup-
port law do distinguish Humanitarian Law Project from certain other First
Amendment cases.  But the Court has never before suggested that national
security and foreign relations interests are categorically distinct from other
compelling state interests, or require a categorically distinct form of First
Amendment scrutiny.  Many of the most important cases protecting speech
and association implicated these concerns, yet never before has the Court
cited them as a basis for what I have called “deferential strict scrutiny.”
Congress’s prohibitions on advocating Communist doctrine and associ-
ating with the Communist Party just as squarely concerned foreign relations
and national security.  If ever there were a case for deference, the anti-Com-
munist laws would present it.  As noted above, Congress had actually heard
substantial evidence on the Communist Party, and made specific findings
based on that evidence.  The anti-Communist laws were “preventive,” and
addressed an “evolving threat[ ] in an area where information can be diffi-
cult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess.”106  And
the government argued, as it did in Humanitarian Law Project, that support
of the organization’s legal ends would inevitably further its illegal ends.  Yet
the Court did not defer to the government’s assertions, and ruled that Con-
gress could restrict advocacy only when it constituted incitement to criminal
conduct, and association only when it was specifically intended to further
the group’s illegal ends.107
Similarly, in Boos v. Barry,108 the Court rejected the government’s argu-
ment that concerns about U.S. relations with foreign powers justified a regu-
lation banning displays near foreign embassies that were “designed or
adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign govern-
ment, party, or organization.”109  Because the statute was content-based, the
Court subjected it to “exacting scrutiny.”110  The government argued that the
law served the compelling purposes of avoiding friction with foreign coun-
tries (a “preventive” measure), and furthering an international legal obliga-
tion under the Vienna Convention to respect diplomats.  The Court refused
to defer to Congress’s judgment that such a ban was necessary, noting,
among other things, that Congress had enacted a less restrictive law for ap-
plication outside the District of Columbia.111  Thus, even though the case
involved foreign relations, the Court applied traditional strict scrutiny, and
declined to defer to Congress.112
There are powerful reasons to be skeptical about deference to govern-
ment efforts to suppress speech in the name of national security or foreign
relations.  In the modern world, when speech can be immediately communi-
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365 (1937).
108 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
109 Id. at 316 (quoting D.C. CODE § 22-1315 (1938)).
110 Id. at 321.
111 Id. at 329.
112 Id. at 334.
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cated around the world via the Internet, virtually all speech might implicate
foreign affairs.113  And national security is an equally capacious standard.
The history of censorship in the United States has shown that security con-
cerns are often cited to defend censorship and political repression.  If such
incantations were sufficient to trigger judicial deference to restrictions on
speech and association, political freedoms would be gravely at risk.  Thus,
the fact that a law affects foreign relations and national security is not a
sound basis for applying less than rigorous scrutiny where the law penalizes
speech on the basis of content.
3. Foreign vs. Domestic Organizations
The third and final potential basis for limiting Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject is that the material support law regulates speech and association with
foreign, not domestic, organizations.  The Court emphasized that it did “not
suggest that Congress could extend the same prohibition on material support
at issue here to domestic organizations.”114  Should the fact that plaintiffs
sought to communicate to and with a foreign organization affect the First
Amendment inquiry?  This distinction might help explain the majority’s fail-
ure even to address the Communist Party cases.  Those cases involved re-
strictions on association with the U.S. Communist Party, a domestic
organization.  While Congress had found that the U.S. Communist Party was
part of an international conspiracy headed and supported by the Soviet
Union,115 it was nonetheless also an indisputably domestic group, part of the
American domestic polity.  The PKK, by contrast, was an exclusively for-
eign organization.
If Congress were to ban speech in coordination with domestic organiza-
tions that had engaged in illegal conduct, even terrorism, it seems unlikely
that the Court would uphold the ban, even if, as was the case with the Com-
munist Party, Congress could cite foreign relations and national security jus-
tifications for doing so, and the group had international connections.
Correlatively, it is not obvious that the Supreme Court in the 1960s would
have invalidated a ban on membership in the Soviet Communist Party.
On the other hand, communication and association with foreign organi-
zations is, and should be, protected by the First Amendment.  Were it not
protected, the Court in Humanitarian Law Project would not have had to
apply any First Amendment scrutiny to the material support law’s applica-
tion.  The Court has long extended First Amendment protection to U.S. re-
sidents’ communications with persons outside our borders.  In Lamont v.
113 See Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More
Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 945 (2011).
114 Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
115 The government argued that the U.S. Communist Party “was under the firm and direct
control of the Communist International and, through it, of the Soviet Union.”  Brief for the
United States at 185, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (No. 336), 1950 WL
78653, at *185 (discussing Congressional findings).
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Postmaster General,116 the first Supreme Court decision to invalidate a fed-
eral law on First Amendment grounds, the Court protected the right of
Americans to receive communications from the Communist Party abroad,
without suggesting that any lower standard of First Amendment protection
should apply merely because the communication came from a foreign
source.117 And in Kleindienst v. Mandel,118 the Court held that U.S. citizens
had an interest, protected by the First Amendment, in exchanging ideas face-
to-face with a foreign national who had been denied a visa.119
Communication across borders furthers many of the values said to be
served by the First Amendment.  Exchange with foreign voices informs citi-
zens about world affairs, and thereby furthers self-government.  The search
for truth, reflected in the metaphor of the “marketplace of ideas,” certainly
knows no borders.  And exposure to perspectives from around the world,
and exchange with people and groups around the world, facilitates self-actu-
alization.  In the modern world, in which the Internet has made transnational
communication routine and immediate, the importance of protecting such
communication has never been greater.120  As Professor Timothy Zick has
argued:
Citizens and many resident aliens communicate with aliens
abroad, obtain information from sources located overseas, collabo-
rate across borders, associate with aliens residing in the United
States and abroad, protest in foreign nations, and report from for-
eign lands.  Digitization has increased reliance upon cross-border
speech and given rise to new forms of cross-border association.
The speech of U.S. citizens now routinely crosses borders, and the
speech of foreigners easily reaches our shores.121
The First Amendment should protect our right to read The Guardian
(UK), as it does our right to read the New York Times, and our right to post
blogs on sites immediately accessible in a distant foreign land, as it does our
right to hand out a leaflet on a neighborhood street corner.  If the govern-
116 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
117 Id. at 306–07.
118 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
119 Id. at 765.  It might be objected that the Court in Kleindienst did not give much First
Amendment protection to this interest, as it held that the government’s denial of a visa should
prevail as long as it had a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for doing so, a very
deferential standard. Id. at 769.  But employing a deferential standard in this setting makes
some sense, as Congress has broad discretion over immigration decisions, and every time a
foreign national is denied a visa, someone in the United States could claim that he or she
wanted to meet face-to-face with that person.  Moreover, the basis for denying entry to Mandel
was, at least ostensibly, that he had violated the terms of his visa in the past, so the rationale
was itself content neutral. Id.  A decision to deny entry on the basis of what he might say in
the United States would present a different case.
120 Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427,
438 (2009) (“[W]hat people do on the Internet transcends the nation state; they participate in
discussions, debate, and collective activity that does not respect national borders.”).
121 Zick, supra note 113, at 946.
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ment could not constitutionally prohibit training a disfavored domestic or-
ganization how to advocate for its rights, it should not be permitted to
prohibit the same training simply because it is directed to a disfavored for-
eign organization.
B. The Distinguishing Features Taken Together: Is the Whole Greater
Than the Sum of Its Parts?
None of the three distinguishing features that the Court identified is
sufficient, standing alone, to reconcile Humanitarian Law Project with ex-
isting First Amendment doctrine.  But what about all three factors taken to-
gether?  Perhaps a stronger case can be made that when the government
seeks to regulate speech directed to foreign organizations for compelling
national security reasons, it should have greater leeway than when it regu-
lates independent speech, prohibits speech addressed to domestic groups, or
acts for reasons other than national security.  Given the tensions explored in
Part II between Humanitarian Law Project and established First Amendment
principles, the decision should be read as narrowly as possible in order to
harmonize it with the precedent from which it seems to depart.  Is there a
principled basis for doing so?
Each feature does seem to play some role in limiting the decision’s de-
parture from precedent.  Thus, while speech coordinated with others de-
serves as much protection as wholly independent advocacy, a ban on
independent advocacy would cast an even more sweeping chilling effect on
political expression.  To assess whether independent advocacy furthers the
interests of a foreign terrorist organization in such a way as to warrant its
prohibition would require a close and nuanced reading of the content of the
speech in question.  As difficult as it may be to define “expert advice,”
“training,” or “coordinated” advocacy, it is infinitely more challenging to
define independent advocacy that somehow “legitimizes” a foreign terrorist
organization, or in some other way might indirectly support the group or
facilitate terrorist activity.  Indeed, such an inquiry would seem to require
the same sorts of causal inferences that the Court has long since rejected.
The Court at various times held that speech could be prohibited if it had a
tendency to lead to illegal activity,122 or posed a “clear and imminent dan-
ger,”123 or advocated action rather than abstract ideas.124  Today, however,
speech may be proscribed based on the relation of its content to criminal
activity only where it is intended and likely to produce imminent lawless
122 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (upholding contempt judgment for
publication of cartoon critical of court, and holding that “if a court regards, as it may, a publi-
cation concerning a matter of law pending before it, as tending toward such an interference, it
may punish it”).
123 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919).
124 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957).
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conduct.125  Thus, a ban on independent advocacy would raise distinct consti-
tutional problems.
Similarly, while the fact that the government cites national security and
foreign relations should not justify the substitution of deference for demand-
ing review of content-based prohibitions of speech, one might nonetheless
insist that at a minimum such deference is not appropriate for interests other
than those asserted in Humanitarian Law Project.  A similar ban on speech
directed to domestic criminal gangs, while it might be said to serve the com-
pelling interest of domestic security, should not trigger deferential review.
And while speech with foreign entities should be constitutionally pro-
tected, deference may be more appropriate when the government targets for-
eign entities for what are effectively diplomatic sanctions.  The political
branches have long imposed such restrictions on foreign governments and
associated entities under the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917126 and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).127  Nations have
long used economic sanctions as a tool of foreign diplomacy, and the Court
has upheld restrictions on travel to foreign countries and transactions with
foreign governments and related entities subject to embargoes, even when
such embargoes restricted citizens’ access to information or ability to engage
in speech activities.128  Here, the sanctions are imposed on foreign terrorist
organizations, not nation-states, raising different concerns about rights of
association.129  But if the deference employed in Humanitarian Law Project
were limited to the deployment of quasi-diplomatic sanctions against foreign
entities for reasons of national security, the decision’s effect would be less
disruptive of First Amendment traditions and principles.130
The material support law’s limitation to speech directed to or coordi-
nated with foreign groups should be seen as essential to the result in Human-
itarian Law Project.  This would be in keeping with the intuition that the
Communist Party cases might have been decided differently had Congress
imposed restrictions on association with the Soviet rather than the American
Communist Party.  And if the rationales accepted in Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject would not suffice to justify a similar ban with respect to domestic orga-
125 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968) (per curiam).
126 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (Supp. II 2008).
127 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (Supp. IV 2010).
128 See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
129 Compare Zemel, 381 U.S. 1 (upholding restriction on travel to Cuba against First
Amendment challenge), with Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (invalidating
restrictions on travel on ground of association with the Communist Party).
130 At times, the majority’s discussion seems to imply that the possibility that speech or
association might disturb a foreign ally is sufficient to warrant its prohibition.  Thus, it
surmised that permitting U.S. citizens to associate with the PKK might undermine our rela-
tions with Turkey.  Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726–27 (2010).
But surely such a concern, standing alone, cannot be a sufficient basis for criminalizing speech
or association. Boos v. Barry refutes such a broad reading. See 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988).
Thus, this aspect of the Court’s discussion must be understood in light of the statute’s principal
concern with not merely upsetting foreign governments, but with preventing terrorist acts that
threaten national security.
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nizations, the decision could be harmonized with the Communist Party
cases. Just as the First Amendment reserves its most jealous protection for
political speech, so it might be argued that while the First Amendment pro-
tects speech and association with foreign as well as domestic groups, at-
tempts to regulate speech and association in the domestic realm warrant
especially skeptical review from the courts.  There are at least three reasons
for directing special skepticism at the regulation of domestic speech and
association.
First, the interest in speaking and associating in coordination with do-
mestic political organizations is arguably closer to the core of the First
Amendment’s protection than the interest in speaking and associating with a
foreign group.  One of the First Amendment’s central purposes is to facilitate
and protect political freedom, and in particular, the polity’s interest in self-
government.131  A liberal democracy requires that its citizens be free to speak
their minds, criticize the government, and join forces with like-minded
others in those pursuits.132  The ability to associate and speak with domestic
organizations is therefore at the very core of the First Amendment’s demo-
cratic purpose.  The ability to associate and speak with foreign organizations
is closer to the periphery—still protected, but less essential.  It is virtually
impossible to imagine meaningful self-government if the state can prohibit
speech in coordination with domestic political groups it disfavors, but re-
strictions on speech with foreign organizations arguably pose a less direct
challenge to the mechanisms of democracy.  Thus, domestic political candi-
dates can be barred altogether from receiving campaign donations from for-
eign organizations and individuals, but cannot be barred from receiving
contributions from domestic individuals, organizations, and corporations.133
Second, the Court has applied its most stringent First Amendment scru-
tiny where the risk of improperly motivated government censorship is great-
est, such as when the government targets political speech for its content or
viewpoint.134  The risk of improperly motivated censorship is arguably
greater with respect to domestic than foreign political groups, precisely be-
cause domestic organizations are potentially in a position to challenge the
incumbent administration’s hold on political power, while foreign organiza-
tions generally are not.
Third, and most importantly, the government has much greater opportu-
nity to control and monitor domestic organizations’ conduct directly.  It can
reduce the likelihood that such groups use their resources for terrorist activ-
ity without restricting speech or association.  Domestic organizations must
obey all of our laws and regulations, are subject to service of process and
asset freezes, can be required to report on their financial affairs, and can be
131 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); see also Boos, 485 U.S. at 318; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
132 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982).
133 Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441e (Supp. IV 2010).
134 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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prosecuted if they engage in criminal conduct.  Foreign organizations, by
contrast, generally operate beyond our jurisdiction, and are therefore much
more difficult, if not impossible, to regulate.  We cannot require that a for-
eign organization follow any particular accounting practice, for example.
And the government can directly freeze the assets of domestic entities whose
activities allegedly support terrorism; it cannot do so with respect to foreign
organizations whose assets are beyond our reach.
As a result, some of the central justifications cited in Humanitarian
Law Project would be inapplicable to a prohibition on speech coordinated
with a domestic terrorist organization.  The Court’s concern that speech
might free up resources or legitimate a foreign group, allowing it to devote
more funds to terrorism, does not arise where the government can freeze the
entirety of a domestic organization’s assets.  Frozen assets cannot be “freed
up” to be spent on anything, much less terrorism.  And if a domestic terrorist
organization’s resources are frozen, it cannot use its burnished “legitimacy”
to raise funds for terrorist ends.
In short, while none of the three features the Supreme Court empha-
sized in Humanitarian Law Project is independently sufficient to justify the
departure from established First Amendment doctrine, the decision is best
harmonized with precedent if read narrowly to rest on all three features—
regulation of speech coordinated with foreign groups for national security
purposes.
C. A Test Case: Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v.
U.S. Department of the Treasury
One court has already adopted such reasoning.  In Al Haramain Islamic
Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Department of the Treasury (AHIF),135 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that Humanitarian Law Project does
not permit the government to prohibit speech coordinated with a domestic
organization designated as “terrorist.”136  Executive Order 13224, issued by
President George W. Bush shortly after September 11, 2001, pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, permits the Executive to
designate domestic entities and individuals as “specially designated global
terrorists.”137  Designation under E.O. 13224 has roughly the same conse-
quences as designation under the material support statute: it becomes a crime
to provide the designated person or entity with any service or anything of
value, including speech, and the designation freezes all of the entity’s assets.
As with the material support statute, the government maintains that IEEPA
prohibits coordinated but not independent advocacy.  Thus, E.O. 13224 ex-
tends to speech and association with domestic entities the same prohibition
135 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2011).
136 Id. at 1023.
137 Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
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on speech and association with foreign entities that the Supreme Court up-
held in Humanitarian Law Project.
In AHIF, an Oregon-based Muslim charity designated as terrorist under
E.O. 13224, and a local community organization, Multicultural Association
of Southern Oregon (MCASO), sought a ruling that they may engage in
coordinated advocacy with each other to protest the designation.  MCASO
specifically sought to coordinate with AHIF-Oregon in speaking to the press,
holding demonstrations, contacting the government, holding a press confer-
ence, and issuing a press release.138  The government argued that Humanita-
rian Law Project controlled, and required dismissal of plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claims.  The court of appeals agreed that its analysis should be
guided by Humanitarian Law Project, but noted that the Supreme Court had
“expressly limited its holdings to the particular facts of the case.”139
The court of appeals emphasized that “the entities in HLP were wholly
foreign, whereas AHIF-Oregon is, at least in some respects, a domestic or-
ganization.”140  It acknowledged that AHIF-Oregon had alleged ties to a for-
eign organization, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation of Saudi Arabia, but also
noted that it had a U.S. presence and legal existence as a nonprofit organiza-
tion incorporated under Oregon law and headquartered in Oregon.  It
deemed this fact significant for two reasons.  First, the fact that the United
States had already frozen all of AHIF-Oregon’s assets meant that there was
little risk that MCASO’s coordinated advocacy with AHIF-Oregon would
free up resources that the latter could direct toward terrorism.141  Second, it
found that permitting U.S. citizens to engage in coordinated advocacy with a
domestic organization was much less likely to engender foreign relations
problems than “direct training of a wholly foreign organization actively at
war with an ally, at issue in HLP.” 142
The court of appeals in AHIF interpreted Humanitarian Law Project
narrowly, respecting the Supreme Court’s admonitions that its decision was
limited to the specific facts of that case.  The fact that the prohibition applied
to speech coordinated with a domestic entity rather than a foreign organiza-
tion led the court to a different, speech-protective, result.  Most importantly,
the court rejected the government’s invitation to read Humanitarian Law
Project broadly.  And by doing so, the court in AHIF helped ensure that
Humanitarian Law Project would not sub silentio overrule a legion of criti-
cally important First Amendment precedents protecting domestic speech and
association against government contentions that they undermine our national
security.  That reading honors the Supreme Court’s efforts to “carefully cir-
cumscribe[ ] its analysis,”143 renders the case less inconsistent with impor-
tant First Amendment precedent that the Court made no sign of overturning,
138 See Al Haramain, 660 F.3d at 1228.
139 Id. at 1050.
140 Id. at 1051.
141 Id. at 1052.
142 Id. at 1054.
143 Id.
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and does the least amount of damage to First Amendment freedoms going
forward.
IV. CONCLUSION
If any speech deserves presumptive protection under the First Amend-
ment, it is speech advocating lawful, peaceful activity.  Until 2010, that was
indeed a core First Amendment principle.  In Humanitarian Law Project, the
Court properly ruled that the government may prohibit such speech only
where it can satisfy the demanding standard that governs when laws prohibit
speech on the basis of its content.  But the Court’s application of that scru-
tiny bore no resemblance to any other speech case in the modern era and, as
I have suggested, employed reasoning and reached results that are sharply
inconsistent with substantial precedent.  Where it had previously protected
even direct advocacy of crime, it now denied protection to advocacy of
peace and human rights.  Where it had previously held that strict scrutiny
placed a heavy burden on the government to demonstrate with concrete evi-
dence that its specific speech prohibitions were necessary to further a com-
pelling end, here it sua sponte advanced arguments that the government
never made; said no evidence was necessary to support its speculations; and
deferred to a legislative finding and an executive affidavit that did not even
address the necessity of prohibiting speech, and were not based on any ac-
tual evidence.  Where it had previously ruled that a desire to suppress partic-
ular viewpoints was enough to render a law presumptively invalid, here it
took the government’s viewpoint-based motive in suppressing messages of
legitimacy as a reason to uphold, not to strike down, the law.  And where it
had previously protected the right to associate with groups having both law-
ful and unlawful ends, and recognized that the right included the freedom to
act in concert with one’s associates, in Humanitarian Law Project it reduced
the right to an empty formalism.
Such dramatic departures from precedent suggest that the decision was
wrongly decided.  That was the view of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor in dissent.  That is also, needless to say, my view as counsel for
the Humanitarian Law Project.  But until it is overturned, we must live with
it.  And that puts a premium on considering whether its rationale can be
limited.  The Court itself offered three possible avenues of limitation, but
offered no explanation for why those avenues were doctrinally significant.
None of the three distinguishing features the Court identified is sufficient to
reconcile the result with First Amendment precedent.  But if the case is to be
harmonized as much as possible with precedent, its application should be
limited to situations in which all three of the factors identified by the Court
are present—namely, when the government is prohibiting only speech coor-
dinated with or directed to foreign organizations that have been subjected to
diplomatic sanctions for compelling national security reasons.  Short of an
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outright reversal, such a reading provides the most persuasive ground for
restricting the damage Humanitarian Law Project does to First Amendment
doctrine.
